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Introduction1
Only a decade ago, the merits of democratization were 
at the forefront of academic and policy-making circles. 
Following the fall of the Berlin Wall, the world was pro-
claimed to have reached “the end of history” and arrived 
at liberal democracy. Understood as “the only game in 
town,” democracy and its promotion became an interna-
tional norm, measured first and foremost by   free and 
fair elections. It is undeniable that with the ousting of 
authoritarian rulers in countries like Libya, Tunisia, and 
Egypt, democratic discourse has opened more opportuni-
ties for citizen participation in formal politics than ever 
before. Interestingly, however, what manifests itself on 
the ground is a stark decrease in affiliation with politi-
cal parties and weak election turnout, which constitute 
deficits in representational democracy. But rather than 
being indicative of people’s disengagement from politics, 
this trend arguably hints at a hollowing out of formal 
channels of democracy. For what we witness today is an 
unprecedented mobilization of people in different corners 
of the world, an ever-growing trend of new modes of 
political participation and civic engagement within and 
beyond the national collective. A new cycle of collective 
action features in policy-making and scholarly agendas, 
organized through and visible in both public spaces such 
as streets and squares as well as the virtual spaces of the 
Internet and social media.
Sweeping across a wide range of political systems, re-
gions, and economies, new modes of collective resistance 
with no clear leadership or ideology have left us with some 
crucial questions. On a more practical level, decision-mak-
ers are faced with questions of how and on whose terms 
to negotiate with the people on the streets, and how such 
negotiations might alter the existing balance of power. On 
a theoretical level, political analysts and scholars are using 
an analytics of resistance to tackle new tools and modes of 
political participation as well as changing meanings and 
practices of citizenship that expand beyond the conven-
tional, duty-based, state-citizen relationship.
These and other questions were explored by the academ-
ics, activists, and researchers who gathered together for 
the conference “Citizenship and Political Participation 
in the Mediterranean Region.” The conference aimed at 
understanding new forms of citizenship, along with the 
opportunities and barriers emitting from new trends 
in and repertoires of political participation. This report 
summarizes the conference’s most-debated issues and 
presents its findings.2
Reconceptualizing and Enlarging the Con-
cept of Citizenship
Politics of securitization and difference surged post 9/11, 
reasserting identity claims and cementing a rationale and 
rhetoric of exclusion. This development, coupled with 
the economic crisis of 2008, lent momentum to people’s 
demands for recognition of cultural differences and for 
economic justice, without which democracy remains void. 
Culminating in moments of insurgence that swept across 
the Middle East and North Africa in 2010-11, the focus 
has shifted away from top-down democracy to bottom-
up citizen participation in politics and society. In trying 
to understand the scope, effects, actors, and agenda of 
contemporary politics of resistance, the very concept of 
citizenship has come under scrutiny in both practical and 
scholarly endeavors.
The conference tackled the origin of the notion of 
citizenship and how it was challenged by new develop-
ments that transcended the nation-state. Citizenship as 
an organizing principle between the state and the indi-
vidual arose from a particular European context; it is one 
of several Enlightenment concepts that gave rise to the 
modern nation-state. Taking its cue from Western indi-
vidualism, the concept of citizenship has been utilized in 
turning “imagined communities” into highly centralized 
bureaucratic states buttressed by a particular sense of 
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nationhood. The nation-state concept of citizenship, the 
principle and usually unquestioned way in which citizen-
ship is understood, assumes people’s existence, sense of 
belonging, rights and duties are bound by and confined to 
a national entity. Yet contemporary practices of migrants, 
minorities or those marginalized by an official citizen-
ship discourse reveal an unraveling of citizenship and its 
decoupling from the territoriality of the nation-state. The 
reasons highlighted at the conference were twofold; first, 
transnational institutions like the European Union offer 
new models and spaces of citizenship in which people on 
the periphery of national citizenship discourse can fulfill 
and claim their rights and freedoms as citizens. Second, 
citizenship is not a stagnant given awarded by the state; it 
is an active and multilayered concept that is constructed, 
negotiated, challenged, and performed through local, na-
tional, and international settings and quotidian practices, 
boosted by technological advancement, in particular 
social media.
Expert opinions differed on the definition of citizen-
ship. Preferences ranged from highlighting the more con-
crete attributes and seeing it as a differentiated concept of 
equality, beyond legal rights, identity, and class to favor-
ing multiculturalism or interculturalism. The varying 
concepts sparked a debate. Some were for example of the 
opinion that multicultural demands are voiced from an 
official state perspective, meaning multiculturalism as an 
idea categorically assumes binaries and self-generating 
collective identities, and therefore reifies identities. Op-
ponents agreed that multiculturalism is a frozen view, but 
countered that interculturalism is the preferable term, as 
it refers to action and interaction and reflects the hybrid 
and changing nature of identities. There was agreement 
that since citizenship is a mindset, channels of cross-
learning, interaction, and dialogue between citizens 
should be created for its cultivation. 
Definitions aside, in calls for legal action and imple-
mentation, people on the margins of discourses of citizen-
ship demand a concept of citizenship that is inclusive, 
non-gendered, and fosters equality. An understanding 
of citizenship as a multilayered construct is required to 
create a framework for such a citizenship. Citizenship 
practices do not necessarily correspond with national 
collectives, as identities are hybrid, multifaceted, and 
always in the making. Globalization, mobility across 
national borders, and advances in information technology 
all challenge conventional modes of citizenship. Beyond 
the rather stagnant and conventional understanding of 
citizenship as a framework of the nation-state, citizen-
ship encompasses belonging to and interacting within a 
number of communities at the sub-state, inter-state, and 
supra-state level. One example presented was Turkish 
migrants in Germany, who actively perform and claim 
citizenship rights by participating in German public space 
without possessing German citizenship. In a similar vein, 
an empirical project entitled ENACT demonstrated that 
Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin, who in fact lack the 
status of European citizenship, are the most active in 
its practice. Not only do they mobilize to pressure local 
authorities and the government of Turkey through insti-
tutional bodies like the European Court of Human Rights, 
they also effectively use European public space to stake 
their claims. Similar to the Kurds, women, Armenians, 
and youth, among others, also make use of the European 
space, which inevitably has changed the official Turkish 
narrative of citizenship.
There was agreement that by exploring citizenship as 
a multilayered and enacted phenomenon, a move beyond 
binaries can materialize, capturing discussions about 
citizenship that are not always reflected in investigations 
thereof as a legal status. However, participants also ag-
reed that the counterproductive regression of citizenship 
rights currently visible in Europe, where exclusionary and 
nationalist discourses are gaining ground and finding 
followers, is a major challenge to such an understanding. 
Still, the necessity of this new conceptualization was 
stressed, and it was asserted that moving beyond a duty-
based towards a rights-based understanding of citizen-
ship requires the protection and extension of citizens’ 
rights and freedoms. To this end, two – often mutually 
dependent – tracks must be followed: redistribution of 
wealth and recognition of difference.
Redistribution of Wealth
Discussions and interventions tackled the long term 
struggle for social and economic justice, which has now 
taken new forms – especially since the 2008 economic 
crisis. Demands for a fairer, economically more just soci-
ety has been at the epicenter of movements from Puerta 
del Sol to the streets of Tunis. The Spanish case was dealt 
with in detail. After severe austerity measures were taken 
in Spain, which suffers from exorbitant unemployment 
rates, highly skilled but unemployed youth have found 
themselves to be the new ‘precarious class.’ Ongoing cor-
ruption scandals, cuts in public spending and high levels 
of income inequality – higher in Spain than in any other 
EU member state according to the OECD –have led to po-
litical distrust in various countries around the world and 
given birth to movements like 15M in Spain. Economic 
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discontent and the housing problem turned into a massive 
social movement, bolstered by an erosion of trust in poli-
ticians and democratic institutions. Alongside demands 
for the democratic regeneration of Spain’s political system, 
the indignados also called for the redistribution of wealth, 
job security, the greater regulation and supervision of 
financial markets, public healthcare, education, and 
implementation of the constitutional right to adequate 
housing. Collective discontent and frustration across 
Spain has manifested itself not only in public occupations 
and social media activism, but also in a growing support 
for separatist claims. Since the start of the economic crisis, 
support for Catalan independence more than doubled, 
rising above 50 percent for the first time. In contrast the 
number of Basques supporting independence remained at 
around 30 percent, which was attributed to the degree of 
fiscal autonomy that is already in place. A disproportion-
ate share of costs fuels support for Catalan independence. 
Evocative of the famous dictum “no taxation without 
representation,” Catalan nationalist rhetoric is against 
redistribution and for more fiscal autonomy, arguing 
that a large share of taxes paid by Catalans should stay in 
Catalonia. The conference also explored the Kurdish case, 
which was found indicative of the correlation between 
economic progress and a decrease in separatist tenden-
cies. Kurds residing in Turkey are not willing to give up 
the economic gains that Turkey’s neoliberal economic 
policies and trade agreements with Northern Iraq have 
transferred to their region. Therefore, for most Kurds, the 
most feasible option seems to be remaining part of Turkey, 
as Turkey is modernizing, is oriented towards Europe, 
and has good economic prospects. 
Recognition of Difference
Deepening material inequalities and growing socio-cul-
tural differences in democracies have helped give voice to 
demands for recognition by those who exist within soci-
ety, but are invisible to the political system. It was found 
that in renegotiating the social contract between govern-
ments and individuals, questions about the very make up 
of society repeatedly crop up. Who constitutes the demos 
of democracy and who is left out is translated directly 
into processes of political participation. The relationship 
between democratic deliberation and national discourses 
of citizenship proves particularly relevant to democracies 
in transition. In other words, identity claims act both as a 
constituent force of as well as an indication of citizenship. 
The debate showed that women, youth, and ethnic and 
religious minority groups, among others, are not content 
to be seen as the objects of welfare policies, but demand a 
voice and stake their claim as subjects in agenda-setting 
and policy-making processes. The right to have and to de-
mand rights acts today as a primary tenet of the practice 
of citizenship, which illustrates how the notion of citi-
zenship has shifted from a duty-based to a rights-based 
understanding.  
Demographics
While the concept of youth is very difficult to pin down 
as it covers a diverse group of people, it was defined from 
a sociological outlook, that is, as a transitional stage 
between childhood and adulthood, between unemploy-
ment and employment. As it encompasses a delicate and 
vulnerable life stage, it is a time when greater guidance 
and support is needed. For that reason, lack of employ-
ment opportunities, failures of educational systems, 
and blocked channels for civic engagement cause deep 
levels of frustration and despair among youth, which 
they then may channel into political activism, grassroots 
movements, or even separatism. It is no coincidence that, 
for example, the Catalan secession movement gained 
popularity among youth at a time when youth unemploy-
ment in Spain is at a staggering 56 percent. Those who 
feel let down the most by the political status quo are more 
likely to fight against it. With little to lose, youth tend to 
be more active and daring in the expression of their dis-
sent. The uprisings in the Arab world were taken as a very 
powerful example of this fact.  
Conference participants noted that young people, who 
are in the formative years of building their identities and 
are not well accommodated by prevailing narratives of 
citizenship, develop a sense of belonging through the 
movements they take part in, which in turn mobilizes 
them. In the example of a Kurd jailed in Turkey, a partici-
pant elaborated that even being labeled as a terrorist can 
offer a space of identification. However, understanding 
the group as a source of identity comes with the risk of 
overperforming membership in trying to maintain iden-
tification with and loyalty to the group. This comes at the 
expense of losing sight of the principles with which the 
group first set out. As groups tend to favor centralization 
and unity, group rights and demands often subsume the 
opinions of individual members. 
Gender
Part of the debate and some of the interventions scruti-
nized women’s rights and issues and how they have long 
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been a battlefield in the Arab region. Women have been, 
and still are, instrumentalized in the political arena 
by a patriarchal mentality. One point raised was that 
women’s rights have continuously been utilized for the 
consolidation of a male-dominated state apparatus under 
the pretext of modernization, Islamism, or other meta-
narratives. Hence investigations of the legal and symbolic 
status leant women were considered deficient, as they 
portray only a limited picture of women’s issues. Despite 
their effectiveness and visibility, both historically and in 
recent uprisings, women – as protesters, human rights 
activists, bloggers, opposition politicians, etc. – still lack 
representation in the formal contemporary political scene. 
A sentiment shared by conference participants was that 
women’s agency is acknowledged only at times of extraor-
dinary measures. The rule is rather that women in the 
Arab world are relegated to domestic and private spheres 
in which they are easy to control and regulate.
The example of Tunisia was central to this debate. 
With the adoption of a modernizing and secular Code of 
Personal Status in 1956, Tunisia was seen as exemplary for 
women’s rights in the region. Starting with independence, 
Bourguiba’s reign marked an era of state-sponsored 
feminism. Emancipation of women materialized through 
a top-down approach initiated by the political elite. From 
1987 to 2011, the governments that followed Bourguiba 
also utilized women’s issues as a means to their political 
ends. Their expressed objective was no more and no less 
than underscoring the prevailing modern face of Tunisia. 
After the ousting of Ben Ali, Tunisia tried to translate 
political activism on the ground into formal politics by 
adopting a gender parity law for the upcoming elections, 
which required candidate lists to be evenly split between 
men and women, itemized so that genders alternated. 
Comprising 50 percent of the candidates, women headed 
only eight percent of the lists. Since the legal framework 
set out by the High Commission was loosely formulated, 
parity was applied horizontally and not vertically in elec-
tion lists. Only one party, PDM, also interpreted parity 
vertically, so that women headed their lists. The structure 
of voting therefore amplified the systematic male pre-
ference. Although all female candidates were affected, 
secular women were affected most. Women from the 
Ennahdha party held almost all of the seats won by fema-
le candidates. This disparity was owing to the fact that 
Ennahda was the most successful party in the elections. 
Conference participants discussed Ennahda’s stand 
as regards the compatibility of Islam, citizenship, and 
democracy. While the party defines itself as inspired by 
Islam and tries to protect women’s rights, it also promotes 
conservative family values and gender roles, which cont-
radicts the party’s rhetoric. However, this was interpreted 
as a political strategy through which the party tries to 
gain societal consensus, unlike the Muslim Brotherhood 
in Egypt. It was elaborated that Ennahdha showed little 
enthusiasm for consensus building at the level of legisla-
tion, yet a strong willingness to reach consensus at the le-
vel of governance, as it agreed to govern with secularists. 
This was believed by all to be an interesting example for 
other countries in the region in terms of how Islamic va-
lues can be reconciled within a reformist understanding 
of sharia through a democratic and pluralistic understan-
ding of citizenship. If successful, the argument went, this 
would give positive signals for other countries trying to 
bridge Islamic values and liberal democracy. 
The polarizing climate in Tunisian society today was 
found to be projected on the female body, and the antago-
nistic juxtaposition of Islamists and secularists in Tunisia 
serves merely to deepen divisions between women. Gen-
dered manifestations of both camps are nurtured by, and 
continue to perpetuate divergent visions for the Tunisian 
polity in which women are always marginalized. There 
was consensus that gender questions will continue to be 
a contentious issue in the political spectrum, and that 
women’s rights will still be instrumentalized for political 
gains. According to many, this is why discussions over the 
role of women and their claims for equal citizenship must 
reach beyond a mere investigation of their legal status 
and focus more on the ways in which legality is translated 
into practice.  
Language
Linguistic policies of nation-states relate not merely to is-
sues of political management, but form a constitutive part 
of a larger ideological national discourse. Since language 
is both a reflection and an instrument of political power, 
its (in)visibility and status in public spaces hints at the 
ways in which the concept of citizenship is delineated by 
political authorities. 
Language forms an integral part of separatist iden-
tity formation and is a powerful rallying point in many 
cases. Centered on the preservation and distinctness of 
their language, both Kurds in Turkey and Catalans in 
Spain – historically denied the use of their mother tongue 
– differentiate themselves based on their language. It was 
highlighted that although there has been a shift from the 
demand for Kurdish independence to a rather vaguely for-
mulated demand for democratic autonomy, the movement 
still calls for an enlargement of civil and political rights, 
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above all rights involving the use of the Kurdish langua-
ge in education, media, and political life. In comparison, 
Catalans have won the right to education in their mother 
tongue, but the Catalan language still serves as a key 
reference point in defining Catalan identity. 
A close look was also taken at Morocco’s linguistic 
characteristics and politics. Its tangled linguistic lands-
cape is a fitting case to illustrate how linguistic policies 
mirror and mold political debates on national identity 
and recognition of ethnic differences. In 2011, in response 
to protests sweeping Morocco, a new constitution was 
introduced by King Mohamed VI which made Tamazight 
an official language of the state alongside Arabic and 
hence recognized the cultural diversity of Moroccan 
society. Following the establishment of the Royal Insti-
tute of Tamazight Culture in 2001, constitutional ack-
nowledgement of Tamazight was considered a promising 
act for the achievement of equal citizenship. However, it 
was lamented that the government has yet to pass the 
legislation required to implement the initiative, which 
would integrate Tamazight into teaching and other areas 
of public life. Along with the status of Tamazight, another 
linguistic debate taking place in Morocco was depicted 
as a telling case study; the question of whether Darija, 
Moroccan Arabic, should replace classical Arabic as the 
language of school education. In general, these debates 
about language reflect the transformations in Morocco’s 
national identity and in the country’s discourse on citi-
zenship. 
Ethnicity 
If citizenship protects and promotes a national identity, 
then all groups constituting “the nation” need to be at 
ease with its conceptualization. Similar to debates around 
linguistic habitus, ethnic references in discourses of 
national citizenship demarcate the boundaries of citizen-
ship. When drafting a new constitution, articles on the 
make-up of society tend to spark huge controversy, as 
was the case in Tunisia, Morocco, and Turkey. In draft-
ing the new constitution in Turkey for example, Article 
66 of the constitution – “Everyone bound to the Turkish 
state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk” – sparked 
huge controversy and was attacked in particular by the 
Kurdish political movement, along with liberals who 
fought against a constitutional basis for assimilation 
and demanded an “ethnicity-free” definition of citizen-
ship. The Kurdish issue in general was part of an intense 
debate on questions of ethnicity. The peace process 
between the PKK and the Turkish state led to a ceasefire 
and enabled first steps towards deliberative democratic 
engagement in Turkey. A group that called itself “wise 
men” was formed to reach out to people and engage them 
in political discussion and negotiation, which not only 
contributed towards voicing the demands of Kurds, but of 
all constituent yet marginalized groups of society such as 
women, Alawites, youth, etc. Although the way in which 
the peace process was initiated and the non-democratic 
formation of the “wise men” were heavily criticized, there 
was agreement that both have opened up the floor for an 
all-embracing discourse on citizenship.
Religion 
Along with claims of linguistic rights and demands for 
the enlargement of the ethnic boundaries of citizenship, 
religion constitutes another important area of negotiation 
in the remaking of the social contract between the state 
and individuals, and the conference also revolved around 
this contentious element of the social fabric. 
There are different political arrangements between 
state apparatus and the religions to which their citizens 
adhere. Coming from distinct historical trajectories, 
France, Canada, Great Britain, and the United States il-
lustrate alternative ways of regulating the role of religion 
in politics. Arguably, Great Britain has the most moderate 
attitude towards religion; it has adopted a laissez-faire 
understanding and has managed to achieve greater social 
cohesion by delegating power and empowering local 
communities. In contrast to the moderate secularism of 
Britain, France follows a path of anti-multiculturalist 
rhetoric, and refuses to accommodate group-specific re-
ligious provisions; instead, an individualistic citizenship 
framework prevails. 
Interventions and discussions focused on the empha-
sis on recognition of group particularities as regards the 
claims put forward by religious minorities. Interestingly, 
however, as grounded as these claims are in cultural 
narratives, they also pragmatically connect to a broader 
framework of universal principles like freedom, equality, 
and human rights. As a product of liberal egalitarianism, 
multicultural citizenship in practice ensures the rights of 
individuals, while at the same time granting group-based 
exceptions. 
Related to liberal, communitarian debates in political 
philosophy, the trade-off between individual and groups 
rights also raises questions on how to reconcile religion, 
a communitarian value system, with an individualized 
narrative of liberal citizenship. The law on awqaf (Islamic 
endowment) in Tunisia made a fitting example to illust-
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rate the priority of community in Islam in contrast to the 
strong position of the individual in liberal thinking. As 
a social religion, Islam follows a utilitarian as opposed 
to an individualist logic, in that goods and services that 
are beneficial to the community are prioritized over the 
rights of individuals. In this vein, proponents of reesta-
blishing the awqaf system in Tunisia argue that it would 
provide Tunisian society with collective goods and ser-
vices. However, some argued that instituting the awqaf 
system would create a state within a state, whereby public 
property would be under the control of private entities 
instead of the state. The debate on the reinstitution of 
awqaf thereby underlines another crucial debate in politi-
cal theory on the size and scope of the state. The state, as 
a political apparatus, is understood to function primarily 
in order to provide its citizens with public goods and 
services, and it plays a central role in cultivating a civic 
culture in which citizens’ welfare is maintained while 
their agency is recognized. Civil society organizations can 
act only as complements and not alternatives to the state. 
This is why some argue that against the background of a 
weak state, private endowments would take up a central 
role in the public sphere, and would promote their own 
weltanschauung, binding people through the educational 
and cultural services they provide. The Muslim Brother-
hood in Egypt and the Gulen movement of Turkey are two 
good examples of winning people over through financial 
resources. 
The opposite, one statement indicated, is also possible. 
A strong state can override civil society and democratic 
checks and balances. The political authority then appro-
priates civil society at will. The Turkish state served as an 
example. Its centralized and strong bureaucracy started 
off as a military project and was not built to serve its citi-
zens. Since then, it has never learnt to protect and provide 
for the welfare of its people. As this is more of a structural 
problem, Turkey was believed today to be undergoing 
a power shift in state authoritarianism from Kemalists 
to Islamo-Kemalists. The conundrum of a state caught 
between serving its citizens and fighting for its survival 
is central to debates on enlarging citizenship rights and 
freedoms. As increasing distrust in institutional politics 
and growing demands for equal citizenship have demons-
trated, authoritarian practices are doomed to fail, even if 
they bring about economic success for a small number of 
people. Moreover, people raise their voices not merely for 
economic reasons but equally, if not more so, to protest 
majoritarian policies pursued by the ruling elite. 
An important point raised here was the gap between le-
gality and practice. Rather than serving as a unifying act, 
drafting a new constitution provided wiggle room for the 
political elite who aimed to retain the existing balance of 
power by adopting new laws and utilizing new codes. Alt-
hough legal improvements need to be understood as fun-
damental steps towards practicing full citizenship, there 
was agreement that one has to be cautious about the ways 
in which recognition and enlargement of citizenship 
rights and liberties become an instrument of political au-
thorities and do not automatically translate into practice. 
Therefore, with regard to the accommodation of different 
cultural and ethnic groups, making Tamazight an official 
language, women’s rights, and religious freedoms, legal 
texts have to be put into practice, for only upon imple-
mentation can equal citizenship for all be attained.
Going beyond the Nation-State
The conference discussed the effect of new transna-
tional actors and their institutional offshoots that both 
cultivate and undermine the concept of citizenship. 
Practices of European citizenship by non-citizens/non-re-
sidents, e.g. the Kurds residing in Turkey, enabled by the 
extended economic, legal, political, and normative orders 
developed around the EU, enlarge and enact the concept 
of citizenship both of nation-states and of the European 
Union. Democratic consolidation, and more specifically 
the process of accession to the European Union, has 
brought decisive change to Turkey’s discourse on citizen-
ship. There was agreement that over the past fifteen years, 
Europeanization has been the most influential parameter 
in making Turkey’s citizenship framework more inclusive. 
Boosted by globalization, new institutional models offer 
new models of belonging as well. For instance, based on 
the European model of economic integration and cultural 
diversity, Catalans hope to remain within the EU after a 
possible secession. 
At the same time, the debate highlighted the fact that 
external actors also undermine citizen participation in 
representational democracies, as growing interdepen-
dence brings about restrictions on citizens’ say about 
their countries’ affairs. When institutions like the IMF, 
for example, make decisions on crucial political matters, 
public trust and legitimacy is undermined, as happened 
in Greece. This is one of the important factors causing the 
hollowing out of democracy and is the reason why people 
start shying away from conventional methods of partici-
pation and develop new methods and repertories in order 
to stake their claims and get their demands across.
8 EUMEF 20th New Faces Conference: Citizenship and Political Participation in the Mediterranean Region
DGAPreport  / No. 24 / November 2014
Enacting Citizenship
Political participation and participation in democratic 
processes in general are changing and liquid phenomena. 
In the current political setting, it is crucial to distinguish 
between formal and informal channels and means of 
participation. Formal channels could be defined as par-
taking in local or national elections, whereas informal 
channels refer to a number of means and tools that have 
been developed by citizens in order to express their needs 
and demands. These not only crystallize in social move-
ments and social media, but are also reflected by citizens’ 
involvement in civil society formations and platforms or 
simply public forums. 
Interplay of Formal and Informal Channels of 
Participation
It was stressed that the boundaries of what is traditionally 
conceptualized as “political” or “political actors” need 
to be expanded in order to incorporate social actors who 
are alienated from the political system. Alienation might 
be due to exclusionary state measures, a feeling of being 
unrepresented and hence unwillingness to participate 
through formal channels, and/or a feeling of mistrust 
towards established state mechanisms. A new conceptual-
ization of “the political” might then encompass everyday 
forms of political action including the social ties formed 
through kinship or vicinity. This new conceptualization 
was found to be especially crucial as regards the posi-
tion of marginalized or subaltern groups who live under 
precarious conditions, have encountered state violence 
and oppression, and have no access to channels that allow 
them to voice their demands. This in turn can and often 
does lead to the creation of silenced masses, who are 
not in a position to effectively express their needs and 
demands. At the same time, alternative or new ways of 
participation might be the result. Any space where social 
interaction occurs – be it a market square, a mosque or a 
wedding – can become a form of participation. The point 
made was that, especially in more authoritarian settings, 
these spaces of interaction turn into important tools for 
individuals to engage in the process of public opinion 
forming. 
People across the globe, including Europe, Turkey, and 
the Arab world, have turned towards alternative channels 
to articulate their existence and have come up with new 
forms and repertoires of political engagement. Social 
media, hip-hop, rap, art, street dancing, comedy, humor, 
and graffiti have thus become important tools of political 
advocacy. These everyday forms of resistance act as the 
weapons of the weak. They intervene in time and space 
within the official narrative imposed by the state, and 
these ‘softer’ forms of engagement were found to function 
as leverage for change, demonstrating that active citizens 
are in need of a democratic system which goes beyond 
the sole recognition of conventional tools of participation. 
These new forms of participation also result in a politics 
of space within which different means of expression are 
used and public squares can create a constituent counter-
power. The same holds true for the digital space created 
by social media, a new space for citizenship interaction. 
However, one crucial question posed was: how responsive 
are power-holders to this newly transformed political 
space? What are their attitudes about and reactions to 
the newly emerging means of participation and mediums 
of interaction? Power-holders across many regions try to 
retain their positions without any feedback or question-
ing from society. This non-communication and the lack of 
accountability and of responsiveness mechanisms leads to 
frustration and dissent, and, eventually, unrest and pro-
tests. Hence it was underlined that demands of citizens 
need to be accommodated and that power-holders need 
to be responsive to citizens on the street. The opposite 
reaction (repression) can also have a polarizing influence 
on society, in that supporters of the power-holders are 
brought together by their portrayal as patriotic, loyal citi-
zens. Turkey and Egypt were given as alarming examples 
in this context. 
Another significant aspect which enables citizens to 
better and more effectively participate in political proces-
ses is voicing demands to local administrations. In gene-
ral, it is very difficult for citizens to participate actively in 
highly centralized state structures. Local governments 
– if empowered and if managed effectively and efficiently – 
can have a better understanding of the needs and desires 
of their citizens and are thus better able to respond. Em-
powering local administrations and increasing political 
dialogue between these structures and citizens was held 
up as one of the key ways in which political participation 
might be enhanced. Morocco was taken as an example 
of a country that is empowering local structures. Larger 
space was given to women and youth in a referendum 
held on July 1, 2011. According to the new constitution, 
youth shall participate in democratic processes through 
youth consultative councils. This provision was put into 
force due to the problem of youth apathy, which emana-
ted from distrust in a political system that was unrespon-
sive to their claims and demands. Youth councils were 
created at the local and municipal level to provide incen-
tives for young individuals to engage more actively in the 
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political process. Youth participation in political parties 
has also been furthered through a quota system, taking 
into account the ever-increasing interest among youth to 
become active within civil society. The February 20 Move-
ment, which was the driving force behind the uprising in 
Morocco, functioned as an important social mechanism 
and a way of expressing young people’s demands for 
participation in formal politics. The Moroccan experience 
demonstrated how established, formal state structures 
can respond to emerging political demands through legal 
changes and the institutionalization of mechanisms of 
participation. There were doubts, however, as to whether 
this new mechanism will be sustainable and effective and 
whether there is a genuine will by the political elite to 
integrate recommendations made by youth into policy.
A controversial topic dealt with in this context per-
tained to the extent to which freedom of expression and 
participation should be granted. Should formal mecha-
nisms be open to any kind of political view? The case of 
increasing radical right-wing tendencies in Europe – es-
pecially the case of Golden Dawn in Greece, which gained 
popularity after the name dispute with Macedonia – were 
at the heart of the controversy. The name issue, coupled 
with the exigencies created by harsh austerity measures 
and the euro crisis, allowed the movement to gain popu-
larity and establish itself in Greek politics. Since then, it 
has become more radical and has engaged in organized 
incidents of verbal and physical attacks against migrants. 
Although it endorses a racist and violent agenda, Golden 
Dawn is nevertheless a legitimate political party that was 
able to establish itself within formal politics. This raises 
the question of the limits of participation in formal poli-
tics. Where should the line be drawn? And would more 
restrictions only direct these radical sentiments under-
ground, making them even more dangerous? 
The question of limits to the freedom of expression 
also emerged when dealing with the Internet as a new 
channel of participation. In an age in which access to and 
the spread of information are accelerated, the Internet 
has become a crucial political space in which individu-
als can interact freely and share their opinions. Online 
social movements, together with an insurgent form of 
online citizenship, have become more and more influ-
ential. Social media not only plays a crucial role merely 
in mobilizing people and keeping them in contact with 
one another, but it also provides citizens with a chance 
to remain engaged and active in the political sphere. For 
example, different Internet platforms are currently used 
to hold states accountable for their actions. A striking ex-
ample presented at the conference was that of Mursimeter, 
a bilingual (English/Arabic) website that monitored the 
performance of the first democratically elected president 
in Egypt, Mohamed Morsi, by tracking his achievements 
as regards the 64 promises he made. The French website 
copwatch.org was presented as another example. It mo-
nitors the actions of French police officers by publishing 
photos or videos of excessive police violence. Wikileaks 
has also been a breakthrough in the publishing of secret 
state documents. The consensus was that all of these 
new digital developments have the potential of ultimate-
ly transforming methods of political participation, but 
also the ways in which states attempt to control the new 
online public sphere. One participant made the point that 
we already are witnessing so-called established democra-
cies rewriting laws in order to limit freedom of expres-
sion, especially on the Internet. Their justification is the 
protection of individual privacy and state security, which 
has opened up an ongoing and ardent debate on the limits 
and implications of freedom of opinion.
Participation in Social Movements
Conference participants pinpointed varying motivating 
factors behind social movements. A mismanaged econo-
my, corrupt structures, youth unemployment, marginal-
ization by official discourses and policies, and inequalities 
are some of the often mutually dependent incentives. 
Thus seen, actors of social movements transcend national 
boundaries and signal solidarity with groups across the 
globe that suffer from the same grievances and inequali-
ties. The distinction between social movement, protest, 
and social moment was deemed fundamental when creat-
ing an analytical framework for discussion. The word 
“movement,” according to one argument, implies a highly 
structured group of people with a concrete agenda. In 
this sense, the idea of a “movement” is very much linked 
to the logic of the state. This distinction was believed to 
be key to differentiating between the informal and formal 
actors of any type of social upheaval. Whether the Gezi 
protests, for example, can be defined as a movement or 
shall ever become one was doubted by experts and par-
ticipants. But classifications aside, the Gezi Park protests 
in Turkey were stated as a crucial moment of a new delib-
erative urban citizenship, in which urban citizens take a 
clear stance when delivering their messages and opinions 
about how public space should be controlled and struc-
tured. It marked an instance of reclaiming urban space 
that belongs to, or should belong to, the people. It was a 
revolt against established political parties and a flawed 
representational democracy, against a political system 
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that is highly centralized, and a government which has 
turned more authoritarian. It was seen by participants as 
a leaderless uprising with ongoing political momentum 
and as yet unknown political consequences. Phenomena 
such as the Gezi protests can usually not be sustained for 
a long period of time, since they are quickly appropriated 
by the system. But there is no linear line of progression 
and no end to the ramifications and repercussions of the 
moment. It will resonate over time and come to the fore at 
crucial social moments, so one expert opinion. 
Many common characteristics were found when analyz-
ing social movements across the globe. In, for example, 
“occupy” movements around the world, citizens came to-
gether to demonstrate opposition to their leadership. Re-
sistance became a hegemonic force, even if only at certain 
moments in time. Mistrust towards established political 
participatory mechanisms and a sense of non-represen-
tation were also common features of other mass social 
protests from Bangkok to Bosnia and from Ukraine to 
Egypt. Another common characteristic was that there is 
always an igniting moment, but dynamics were develop-
ing long before that one moment. In Egypt, mobilization 
started long before the Tahrir protests. In Istanbul, there 
were already mass protests on May 1, and smaller protests 
earlier. Therefore, these social upheavals can also be seen 
as an accumulation and eruption of public dissent.
Conclusion
Recent political and social developments across the globe 
have marked a significant change in traditional ways of 
making and participating in politics. The reconstitution 
of what is called the political together with new concep-
tualizations of citizenship and new forms of political and 
democratic participation opened up debates on a changed 
understanding of “public space.” Citizens’ interactions 
have diversified, encompassing new means of interaction, 
and citizenship has come to be defined on more individu-
alistic terms. Putting rights and freedoms at the core of 
citizenship has opened new windows for participation 
and challenged established participatory mechanisms. 
The redefinition of the political and of public space has 
thus prepared the ground for new forms of political par-
ticipation within which any kind of self-expression can be 
regarded as a participatory act. Thus the political sphere 
has evolved into a framework for individual action in 
which participation is taking place not only through for-
mal means, but through channels ranging from the arts 
and culture to social media activism. This new conceptu-
alization of the political does not confine the political to 
parliament, governmental procedures, and constitutional 
arrangements, but rather refers to a reactivation of politi-
cal thinking encompassing elements of direct democracy 
and civic engagement. 
In all of the cases showcased during the conference, citi-
zenship was literally “enacted,” with the aim of enlarg-
ing rights and freedoms and the legal framework within 
which they are defined. From a legal notion, citizenship 
has turned into an enacted, active concept through 
which citizens act for their democratic rights. Crucial to 
these changing notions and practices is an understand-
ing of how to build on collective energy and on the new 
channels of political expression, as well as how to make 
power-holders more accountable and more attentive 
to these new forms of participation. Only time will tell 
whether established systems will manage to absorb new 
forms and modes of politics by subsuming all alterna-
tives, or whether the clash between the “established” and 
the “new” will give way to further fragmentation and a 
deepening of societal cleavages. 
Other fundamental questions remain that still need 
deeper analysis and attention: How can the gap between 
formal and informal participation be bridged? Where can 
one draw the line between formal and informal participa-
tion? How can different forms of participation be linked 
to a shifting understanding of citizenship? How do new 
channels or tools of participation challenge or strengthen 
established state structures and mechanisms? How can 
the formal system regain the trust of people and be more 
reflective of society? These are important questions that 
need to be tackled thoroughly in order to better conceptu-
alize the influence of a newly emerging “politics of public 
squares” on traditional, formal politics. At the end of the 
day, politics and democracy are processes that are con-
tinually renegotiated and redefined; they are processes in 
the making even in so-called established democracies.
Notes
 1  The conference was held under the Chatham 
House Rule.
 2  It must be noted that questions pertaining to the 
conceptualization and practice of citizenship are 
inherent to discussions of political participation. 
In accordance with the conference structure, 
the report’s distinction between citizenship and 
participation is solely for analytical purposes; in 
practice these concepts are closely intertwined 
and there is no clear-cut distinction.
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